Coup d'état in Peru: an example of the neoliberal judicial war tactic of Lawfare.

Last week in Peru we saw another coup d'état in Latin America. This time it was not by the now ex-president Castillo, as the right-wing press notes, but the capitalist elite that control the country through their management of the parliament and the judicial institutions. For many years seen this strategy in Latin America, which is a form of counter-insurgency, see section C, called “lawfare”. Basically, in place of state violence, the law is used to overthrow popular government that threaten the established order. As such, it forms part of the United States (US) government strategy in coordination with the elites of each country to sustain the system of capitalism that benefits both.

This tactic has its roots in the US elite-led counter-revolution of the 1970s. Reflecting this, by the late 1970s the US government began to evolve from Keynesian capitalism to the neoliberal mode. In terms of the economy, it meant that the US stopped promoting the welfare state for one that favoured free markets and financial capital. On the other hand, there was a change in the way that global capital flows were guaranteed. In other words, instead of supporting dictators and military regimes to control dissident populations in the Global South, the US developed a strategy of democracy promotion.

With this, the US and its allies have imposed a type of democracy that promotes the market and the individual. Yet, it also fractures the bonds that build a communal and cooperative society. Despite this, at times, the people vote for politicians that break with the neoliberal path, whether they are from the left or right.

When this happens, the US and friends have many tools to constrain popular governments. But here, we are going to focus on the use of lawfare. The first incident in Latin America occurred in Mexico in 2004 against the then mayor of Mexico City, and current president of the country, Lopez Obrador; with the goal of derailing his presidential campaign in 2006. After that we saw it used against presidents in Honduras, Zalaya in 2009, and Brazil, Dilma in 2011. In addition, some ex-presidents were also attacked. Once again in Brazil, where Lula spent 580 days in prison, and in Ecuador, where Correa was sentenced to prison in absentia. Both were charged with corruption, but the real motive was to ensure that neither could stand again for president. And in the last week we saw the Peruvian president, Castillo, arrested. Who is now facing 20 years in prison for charges of rebellion. And it is with this last example that I will explore how lawfare functions.

First the context. Castillo is an indigenous politician that used to be a teacher and a member of a rural militia called Rondas Campesinos. These militias worked with the military and government against left-wing gorillas in the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, despite what the media suggests, he is a conservative leader. Nevertheless, the neoliberal elite of Peru have disliked from the beginning. Due to a combination of racism and ideological opposition to his limited program to enshrine education and health as human rights in the constitution.

Under attack from his fist day in office, his inexperience and naivety put him in a very weak position from where he made numerous errors. First, he made many concessions to the right-wing parliament. But despite these deals the neoliberal elite continued to attack him racially and his program through their media empires. By the end of his first six months in power Castillo’s ambitions were finished more or less when his first health minister left his charge.

Unfortunately Castillo continued to make more errors. For example, in order to sustain his position he changed his cabinet many times. But with the new appointments; from his family and party, Perú Libre; the character of his cabinet changed from limited liberal progressive to the standard Peruvian politics of corruption and nepotism.

Due to the corruption allegations, the parliament reached into its lawfare playbook and initiated impeachment proceedings against him. Castillo at this point began to select cabinet members allied to the right in order to prevent his impeachment by the institution. It worked, but by this point he also started to lose support in the wider society, who saw him as weak, and from his own party. While impeachment had not been successful, the tactic had contained the indigenous leader. In effect, turning him into a lame duck president.
But not satisfied with this, the parliament tried to impeach him two more times. And it was this third attempt, weeks after rating agency Fitch downgraded the nations, when the ex-leader tried to dissolve the right-wing body and start a constitutional assembly in order to restore democracy and achieve his campaign promise.

It was his last error. With only the support of the indigenous population left; his party, cabinet, parliament and the security forces sided with the constitutional court that ruled his actions unconstitutional, while a US spokesman called them undemocratic. Now he sits in prison, his future uncertain, but capitalism, at least for now, is once again secure.

Yet, in the week that followed, the indigenous populations have risen up in support of Castillo. The state has responded with murder, a state of emergency and a promise of new presidential elections in April 2024. The protesters have rejected this, gone on strike in the critical copper sector and shutdown transport links. While Castillo was not a radical president his experience at the hands of the neoliberal elite, mirrors the indigenous experience in Peru; and that is enough to motivate them to fight.

Clearly the political instability and turmoil in Peru, that has produced the sixth president in six years, will continue in the long term. Though in the short term the crackdown on the indigenous protesters and the offer of the 2024 vote, now being touted for December 2023 instead, may be enough stop the protests spreading. But the election of Castillo and the reaction to his removal from power shows that lawfare in Peru can only slow down the call for real structural change in the Andean nation.

Of course, for the US government and neoliberal elites in the region lawfare is just one option to contain resistance to capitalism. There are US military ties with national security forces that often work together under the rubric of the drug war. Free trade treaties, the IMF, World Bank and financial capital who constrain the economic options available. International and national elite owned media organisations that limit the public debate. And a US based tech industry that transmits pro-capital message of the US government and elites, fosters the growing global polarisation and is developing the next era of mass surveillance tools.

Still, all this is necessary because of the growing global discontent. What we can take from this is that the future is not certain, and that we can write it; not those in favour of continuing the status quo.